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Recent Decisions

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF

1934-LIABILITY UNDER

16 (b) -Exchange Of Stock Pursuant To A Merger May Constitute A Sale In Violation Of Section 16(b) Because Of Potential For
Speculative Abuse. Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854, rehearing denied, 400 U.S. 920
(1970).
SECTION

In April 1967 the managements of Frontier Airlines and Central
Airlines agreed to propose to their stockholders a merger of their respective companies. Prior to public announcement of the proposed
merger, defendant RKO General, Inc., owner of fifty-six percent of
Frontier's stock, contracted with several major Central stockholders to
purchase forty-nine percent control of Central! Although knowledge of
the proposed merger was not public, the approval of the merger by the
stockholders of both corporations was controlled by RKO, since it owned
controlling interest in Frontier and the purchase contract recited that the
Central shareholders (owners of sixty-six percent of Central) would take
all necessary corporate actions to approve and authorize the merger. In
July the merger was approved by the shareholders of each corporation
and on September 1st the CAB gave final approval. The purchase agreement between RKO and the several Central shareholders was executed
on September 18th, with RKO paying the contract price of $7,550,082.50 and receiving in return the Central shares and debentures. On
the same day the merger was filed with the Secretary of State of
Nevada. The physical exchange of certificates took place on October 1st.
In December, Newark, a stockholder of Frontier, sued RKO alleging
violations under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and was granted summary judgment in regard to liability. At trial on
the issue of damages, judgment of $7,920,681.58 was entered against
RKO.' On appeal, Held, affirmed: The exchange of stock pursuant to
'738,251 shares of common stock. Additionally $500,000 of convertible debentures,
convertible into 149,994 shares of common stock were purchased. If all were converted,
RKO would own 53.86% of the common stock. All were purchased at $8.50 per share.
2Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8

Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The damages

were arrived at by subtracting the cost to RKO ($7,550,082.50) from the value to RKO
of the holdings on September 18th. This was computed as the number of shares of

Central common held (including those represented by convertible debentures) times the
high trade on the New York Stock Exchange for September 18, 1967 (26- ), plus an
additional premium of 15% for control of the company:
507,571 x (264 x 1.15)=
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the merger agreement constituted a "sale" within the context of section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The lower court was not

"clearly erroneous" in assessing a control premium of fifteen percent on

the market value of the stock in computing damages. Newmark v. RKO
General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854,
rehearingdenied, 400 U.S. 920 (1970).
I. SECTION 16(B)-PREVENTIVE, SUCCESSFUL, BUT AVOIDABLE
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted
to prevent the wide abuse of insider information prevalent at the time
of its enactment.! Insiders had been able to make short-swing, speculative
profits by buying or selling stock based on knowledge not public and
reversing the trade after the information was made public. In the usual
situation, an insider would find that his company had discovered a new
product that would substantially improve the company's income potential. He would purchase shares prior to public release of this information,
then sell the shares after the release had caused the price to rise. He
507,571 x $30.48*=
15,470,764.08-total value to RKO
15,470,764.08-Value to RKO
7,550,082.50-Cost to RKO
7,920,681.58 -judgment
* Actually this should be $30.475, making the damage award $7,918,144.23, but Judge
Bonsal rounded off the figure.
"Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. S 78(b)(1971):
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of
any security of the issuer in the name and on behalf of the issuer if the
issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request
or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit
shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction
or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
-'See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 55 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
13 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1077 (2d ed. 1961).
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could similarly profit by selling short prior to an announcement unfavorable to the company.!
In regulating these manipulative practices, Congress faced a difficult
task if actual proof of insider misuse of confidential information were
required. At the same time, any all inclusive statute might penalize many
legitimate business dealings and effectively prohibit an insider from
trading in his company." Realizing that most insider abuse was accomplished through short-term speculation, Congress compromised by
blanketing short-term speculations and allowing long-term speculations
to remain legitimate.' The statute enacted allowed the corporation to
recover any profit realized by an insider who purchased and sold (or sold
and purchased in a short sale) within a six-month period. The intent of
the insider in these transactions was irrelevant. Of course, counsel merely had their clients wait until the statutory period had elapsed to complete their transaction, avoiding any liability under section 16(b). The
congressional objective was attained nonetheless since the six-month
period tended to smooth out short-term price movements that had
proved so successful to insiders in the past. For those failing to wait six
months, the statute has been given broad interpretation, with doubts and
ambiguities resolved against the insider.! The courts have also refused
to apply subjective elements involving motive or interest in the transaction where there has been a finding that the particular type of transaction presents potential for speculative abuse aimed at by section
16 (b)," since motive and intention are irrelevant if the objective requirements of the statute are present.
II. DAMAGE UNDER SECTION 16(B)

Once the question of liability in a section 16(b) action has been decided, computation of profits owed to the corporation is necessary. Most
cases present no problem in computing damages; the profit which must
be returned is the cost to the insider less the proceeds of the sale. However, problems arise if the value received is not wholly monetary. The
court must value something often having no objective value through
Practices such as these were not only wide spread, but were looked upon as one of
the spoils of management. Comment, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate Consolidation: A Section 16(b) "Purchase or Sale"?, 117 U. PENN. L. REV. 1042 (1969).
7 Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency 72d Cong. 2d Sess. and 73d Cong. 1st and 2d Sess. pt. 5-6 C
6557 (1933-34).
8
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. S 78(b), (1971).
9Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036; Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968); Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
10
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
6
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daily trading, or having many subjective qualities to the particular insider. An objective market value can be developed in a number of
ways,' but none involved the numerous questions raised in subjective
evaluation.
Subjective evaluation includes many factors. The value includes any
"special value" placed on the stock by the insider to squeeze any profit
realized by any purchase or sale from the insider." Premiums have been
added for control of a large, closely-held corporation,'3 and for a "recently recruited management team and promising sales prospects."''
However, none of these cases dictate that a premium must be added. In
each case the court must look at the facts and the actual value to the
seller of the property or rights.
III. THE FRIENDLY SKIES OF SECTION 16(B)
There is little doubt that the merger in Newmark contained potential
for the abuses aimed at by section 16(b)." In a market that has repeatedly given a merged company a higher value than the individual companies, the potential for speculative abuse, by one who knows in advance that a merger will take place as RKO did in this case, is clearly
present. RKO contracted to buy Central shares at a price of $8.50 per
share, amounting to a contract to purchase Frontier shares at $14.875,"6
at a time when Frontier was selling at $17.25 per share. " With the announcement of the merger proposal the following day, Frontier stock
jumped to $18.875 and by September 18th, when the purchase contract
was executed and the merger filed, the stock had risen to $26.50 per
share." RKO had used insider information to profit $11.625 per share,
a return of 78.15% on its investment. " Clearly the court was correct in
11Calculations

might include multiples of earnings, similar companies, or trades,

even though infrequent.
"ZBlau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954). See also Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971); Lewis v. Wells,
325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
" Fistel v. Christman, 135 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
14Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" See
66 How.
Pursuant
Brudney,

Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities and Exchange Act,
L.J. 612 (1953). See also Hemmer, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits
to Mergers and Related Transactions, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1101 (1969);
Insider Securities Dealings During Corporate Crises, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1

(1962).
11Figure is based on the exchange ratio of 1.75 shares of Central for 1.00 shares of
Frontier.
17 Closing price N.Y.S.E. May 3, 1967, Wall Street Journal, May 4, 1967.

"Closing prices N.Y.S.E. May 4, 1967 and September 18, 1967, Wall Street
Journal, May 5th and Sept. 19th, 1967.
"The price appreciation is calculated as follows:
$26.50-value per share 9/18/67
14.875-price of share to RKO 5/3/67
$11.625-price appreciation
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concluding that this was a transaction imbued with the potential for
speculative abuse at which section 16(b) was directed.
Even if there is potential or actual abuse, there can be no liability if
all the statutory elements are not present. The time limit and purchase
requirements were clearly met, with all transactions completed within
six months. However, whether the merger constituted a "sale" necessitates discussion. The court found liability by categorizing as a "sale"
the exchange of Central shares for Frontier shares pursuant to the
merger. RKO argued against liability on the basis of the "economic
equivalent" doctrine," contending that it "realized no profit" by exchanging Frontier stock and Central stock for Frontier-Central stock,
since after the exchange it had the same investment position. However,
the individual holdings were not the same economically, since the
merged company possessed advantages over the two companies or the
merger would not have taken place. The merger took place because
Frontier-Central stock was more valuable than Frontier stock and Central stock individually. The court concluded that the economic equivalent doctrine did not apply and that a profit was "realized" within the
meaning of section 16(b), even though no cash sale took place.' If the
exchange of stock is a "sale," the debenture exchange also constitutes a
sale. With all the statutory requirements present, the only question
remaining is the amount of profits realized by RKO returnable to the
corporation. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's assessment
of the damages of $7,920,681.58, the difference between the cost to
RKO of the Central securities ($7,550,082.50) and the value of the
Central shares ($15,470,764.08) on September 18th, the effective date
of the merger.
For the reasons set forth below it can be asserted that the court of
appeals was in error in upholding the assessment of value of the Central
securities to RKO on September 18th. Since the court found a "sale"
in the context of section 16(b), it follows that either a profit was
"realized," or a loss "incurred." Defendant's argument that no actual
profit was "realized," but only "paper profits" as in Heli-Coil Corp. v.
Webster,' fails on two counts. In Hell-Coil the court held that an exchange of corporate debentures for corporate common stock, when the
20

Blau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1963).
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). In essence this means
that a transaction will not be considered a S 16(b) sale when the insider is in the same
economic position both before and after the transaction.
"Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 1970, at p. 12, col. 2. The computation of the
21

pecuinary liability in this case produced "by far the largest money judgment ever

entered in a 16(b) action and probably the largest money judgment ever entered in any
Federal securities action." id.
23 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
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debentures were substantially an economic equivalent of the common
stock, was not a "sale" within the context of section 16(b). However,
the exchange of the stock in Newmark did not fall within the Heli-Coil
exception since it was a "definitive act by the owner of the securities
whereby the paper value of the securities has become a real and includible one."' ' Nor was the exchange an "economic equivalent" as in
Heli-Coil, but an exchange in which RKO received property different
from that exchanged which did not constitute the same investment position. Moreover, in Newmark two issuers are involved, while Heli-Coil
involved only one issuer.
The use of September 18th as the date for affixing damages is questionable since RKO possessed the certificates until October 1st. Since
the court categorizes the exchange of stock a "sale" for purposes of
section 16(b), the value on the October 1st exchange date should be
used to determine damages. September 18th, the day the stock had its
highest value during the period from the effective date of the merger
until the certificates were exchanged,' may be logically used since the
purpose of the statute is to "squeeze out" all possible profits." However,
on the effective date of the merger (September 18th under Nevada
law)" RKO changed from an owner of Central shares to a beneficial
owner of Frontier-Central shares even though the actual certificates had
at 167-68.
Examination of Wall Street Journal from Sept. 18-Oct. 2, 1967 reveals that the
highest trade was $26.50 per share on September 18, 1967.
21Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). Since the purpose of
the statute is to "squeeze" all profits realized out of RKO, its strange income tax consequences were not discussed. Consider the following example: Assume RKO was assessed damages of $100,000.00. Revenue Ruling 61-115, 1961 CuM. BUL., allowed the
taxpayer a deduction from ordinary income under § 165 of the amount paid to settle
a § 16(b) claim. Although the S 16(b) claim was not litigated, the allowance of deduction seems to indicate a judgment paid would also be deductible. Assuming this can be
justified as a business expense, based on present rates, RKO gets $48,000.00 in reduced
tax liability. Since RKO controls Frontier, it could declare an immediate dividend back
to itself. Reducing the liability award by Frontier taxes, the dividends to other Frontier
shareholders, and the amount of taxes RKO would have to pay on the dividend, RKO
receives additional after-tax cash of $24,752.00 for a total return of $72,752.00. Thus
the total cost to RKO for liability is only $100,000.00 less $72,752.00, or $27,248.00.
If the merger allowed Frontier to take advantage of losses such that they had no additional taxes on the liability award, RKO would receive after-tax cash of $51,968.00 for
a total return of $99,968.00 and cost of $32.00. RKO still has the gain in the securities
which when eventually sold (assuming a sale made six months after acquisition at the
price at which liability was set) would give Frontier a profit after taxes of $76,000.00.
Reduced by the cost of the liability award, RKO thus comes out with a profit of
$48,752.00, or in the case of no additional Frontier taxes, $75,968.00.
Thus even though the statute attempts to "squeeze out" all profits, in this example,
the insider could recover after taxes most of his profit on the transaction.
The logical solution for this "loop hole" is to allow the damage award as an increase in the basis of the stock to the insider. This would reduce his gain on the sale
to his actual profit, if any, and avoid him profiting by deducting the liability from
ordinary income and being taxed on the profit through capital gains.
11NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.495 (1970).
4Id.

25

1971]

RECENT DECISIONS

not been exchanged. Once the merger had been approved and filed, the
exchange of shares was only a "mechanical detail." 8 Based on these
arguments, the court correctly determined the valuation date.
The defendant, on the issue of damages, urged that the court value
the stock on the basis of expert testimony offered by an investment
analyst. The plaintiff, however, showed the value on the New York Stock
Exchange where the stock was actively traded, a more rational approach, since it takes into account the market feeling of many investors,
establishing a better measure of market value.
The defendant asserted that the addition of a fifteen percent premium
for gaining control was erroneous. The court reasoned that RKO would
be willing to pay a premium over the market price to maintain control
of the company and added a fifteen percent premuim for this control
retention. It was not erroneous for the court to reject the investment
value thory and at the same time accept an additional value over the
market value based on subjective measures of value. The market value
would not reflect the control factor because none of the trades on the
exchange were made in contemplation of obtaining control of the company.
The addition of the fifteen percent premium seems erroneous for
several reasons. First, in making the purchase contract, RKO paid less
than the market value of the stock. One purpose of the contract was to
maintain "legal" control of Frontier after the merger. Rather than paying a premium for "legal" control, RKO was able to purchase it at a
discount. It would be erroneous to assert that RKO would have to pay
more than market value to retain control; indeed, RKO paid less. While
this factor standing alone is insufficient to disallow the premium, since
there were other considerations in the purchase contract, it is nonetheless an important guideline in determining whether the "control premium" should be added.
Second, the sale of a large block of stock will, under normal circumstances, be made at less than market price, since the "sell" orders outweighing "buy" orders will cause the market price to fall. Since RKO
was the seller, normally it would sell the stock at less than market price,
indicating no premium. Even if the stock had special value to RKO, it
seems the discount RKO would have to take in selling a large block of
stock would offset any premium value.
Third, the trial court allowed the premium because the Frontier
stock had special value to RKO giving it "legal" control; moreover,
section 16(b) allows recovery "of any profit realized."" The court concluded that the award of a premium was discretionary, but decided that
28 2
29

Loss, SEcupnrEs REGULATION 1071-72 (2d ed. 1961).

15 U.S.C. S 78(b) (1971).
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RKO had a "greater need" for the stock since it assured retention of
control. The rationale was that "legal" control was worth a fifteen percent premium, even to a party already owning "working" control. While
control of a corporation usually creates a value in excess of the market
price, when a party is already in "working" control, no premium on the
purchase of more stock will be paid merely because it gives "legal" control. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to saying that the difference
between "legal" and "working" control is the same as the difference
between controlling and noncontrolling positions of ownership. Any
"take over" would require a tender offer to be accepted by almost
eighty-eight percent of the remaining outstanding stock. This would be
unlikely if RKO wished to fight the "take over" since it would only
have to convince seven percent of the stockholders that objections to the
"take over" were valid. It is difficult to see any difference of consequence
in "legal" and "working" control, certainly not a difference of $2,017,594.73.
Fourth, RKO had both "legal" and "working" control of Frontier
prior to the merger, and it could refuse to enter into any merger agreement unless it could retain control after the transactions at an acceptable
price, evidenced by the ability to negotiate a contract to purchase shares
of Central worth a great deal more after the merger. It is not illegal to
retain control or to negotiate in a manner to remain in control after a
merger, or else there would be no advantage in having control of a corporation. RKO could not have been forced to enter into the merger at
an unacceptable price or to pay a premium in excess of market since it
clearly had the upper hand in negotiations, again evidenced by the
amount of profits Central shareholders allowed them to take through
the purchase contract. Thus, the Frontier stock had no "special value"
to RKO for two reasons: first, RKO could not be forced to pay a
premium for any "special value," and second, any "special value" added
to the stock by the merger was under the control of RKO.
The inclusion of the fifteen percent control premium by the court
seems "clearly erroneous," since RKO had no reason to pay any premium
over market to retain "legal" control after the merger.
CONCLUSION
Newmark is a rational application of section 16(b) in the area of
merger transactions. The merger transaction was one with a great potential for the speculative abuses Congress attempted to regulate by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The inclusion of the fifteen percent
"control" premium in the damage award was questionable however, even
if not "clearly erroneous."
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Newmark illustrates that even non-monetary transactions, having no
characteristics of a normal sale, may be treated as a "sale," if the transaction is imbued with the possibility of insider abuse sought to be prevented by section 16(b).
William A. Abney

ORDER-Refusal By The
Aviation Administrator To Entertain A Complaint Against Him
Ground That It Is Beyond The Scope Of The Complaint Statute
A Reviewable "Order." International Navigator's Council v.
444 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

JUDICIAL REVIEW-ADMINISTRATIVE

Federal
On The
Is Not
Shaffer,

Transoceanic airlines have generally employed navigational systems
based upon ocean reflections, ground feed-back signals, celestial sightings or wind and pressure measurements.' To promote safety the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration has set minimum
standards for the accuracy and reliability of these systems pursuant to
the rulemaking authority granted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.'
In 1968 the FAA began approving on an individual application basis,
the installation of a self-contained navigation system known as the Inertial Navigation System.' In late 1969 requisite procedures and standards for approval of an INS system were issued by means of an advisory
circular.' As a result, the carrier had to demonstrate procedures for inspection, testing, maintenance and accuracy of operation.'
On February 25, 1970, the International Navigator's Council of
America! filed a complaint for injunctive relief' with the Administrator
'The four primary systems have been: Loran A (signals from Loran Stations); celestial navigation (sightings of celestial bodies); radar altimeter (measures lateral jet
stream pressures); and Doppler radar (ocean reflections). Brief for Petitioner at 9,
INCA v. Shaffer, 444 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
2 14 C.F.R. § 37.165 (Loran A), § 37.170 (Doppler), § 37.171 (distance measuring
equipment), § 37.173 (radar altimeter) (1970).

$This appliance works independently of any signal outside of the airplane and provides constant update of location information.
4
An advisory circular system is a means by which the FAA can issue "non-regulatory" matter for explanation to the public. FAA Advisory Circular ACOO-1 (December 4, 1962) (explaining the purpose of advisory circulars).
'FAA Advisory Circular 121-13 (October 14, 1969). The INS system is the sole

means of navigation by an air carrier. Use of INS, however, requires a back-up system.
' Brief for Petitioner at 5. INCA is a non-profit association comprised of navigators
employed by air carriers. INCA's stated purpose is to assure "the establishment of and

adherence to the highest possible standards of accuracy and reliability in airline navigation." Id.
SThe plaintiff sought to compel the Administrator "(1)

to prescribe appropriate

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

pursuant to section 1002 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,8 alleging
that the Administrator had violated section 601 of the Act9 by issuing an
advisory circular which was an invalid alternative to formal rulemaking. 8
Moreover, the complaint characterized the failure to promulgate rules

or regulations establishing minimum standards for INS as a threat to air
safety, thus violating his statutory obligations."
The Administrator dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction"
whereupon INCA filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia seeking review of the Administrator's action
pursuant to section 1006 of the Act.13 Held, dismissed: The Administra-

tor's refusal to entertain a complaint against him for failure to discharge
his statutory responsibilities because jurisdiction was lacking is not a reviewable "order"'" under section 1006 of the Act.'

Although section

1002 of the Act provides a procedure, reviewable under section 1006,
whereby any person may file a complaint with the Administrator alleging
violations by third persons subject to the terms of the Act," it fails to provide jurisdiction for a complaint challenging official action or inaction.
rules and minimum standards in the interest of safety, (2) to revoke all existing authorizations to use INS, (3) to suspend the issuance of any pending application and (4) to
refrain from approving any future INS applications, until compliance with the new rules
is demonstrated." International Navigator's Council v. Shaffer, 444 F.2d 904, 908 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). In addition, the complaint sought civil penalties provided in section 901 of
the Act. id.
8
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(a), 49 U.S.C. S 1482(a) (1970): "Any person may file with the Administrator ... a complaint ... with respect to anything done
or omitted to be done by any person .... "
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 601(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1970): "The Administrator . . . promote[s] safety of flight of civil aircraft . . . [and] [sluch minimum
standards governing appliances as may be required in the interest of safety."
oSee note 5 supra.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 601(a), 49 U.S.C. 5 1421(a) (1970). The FAA
has previously employed this statutory rulemaking procedure under section 601 to establish regulations prescribing minimum standards governing all navigational systems
that were in use prior to INS. See note 1 supra; Brief for Petitioner at 11.
"1The Administrator's refusal to entertain and process the complaint which had been
filed with it under section 1002 took the form of a letter which read, in part: "[Y]our
complaint does not state facts which warrant the issuance of an order under section 1002
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to effect compliance with the Act in the respects
set forth in your compliant." Brief for Petitioner at 18.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1006(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970): "Any
order . . . issued by the Administrator . . . shall be subject to review by the . . . United
"
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ...
14The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1005(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1485(f)
(1970), requires that "[elvery order of the Administrator ... shall set forth findings of fact upon
which it is based ....
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1006(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970).
'8 Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969) (violations
of the Act by twenty-nine air carriers); Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966) (violations of the Act by Pan American World Airways); Flight Engineer's Int'l Ass'n v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (violations of the Act by Eastern Airlines).
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Accordingly, a statutorily reviewable order cannot issue."
Statutes granting administrative powers often provide for review of administrative action. 8 Frequently statutes permit appeals to the circuit
court of appeals' from an "order"'" or "final order'"' as a matter of right.
As a corollary, the definition of "order" or "final order" necessarily implies that some actions are not reviewable through statutory review procedures." In such cases the parties must resort to non-statutory review
procedures" such as common law equitable remedies.' However, the
availability of statutory review of administrative agency action does not,
in itself, preclude district court jurisdiction."
17 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
the Secretary of Agriculture had the power to act and his inaction was held to be an
order subject to direct review.
1 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 418 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as L. JAFFE].
'9 The Federal Communications Act § 402(b), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970) is representative in that it provides for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. See also note 11 supra.
20National Labor Relations Act § 9(d), 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1970); Federal Communications Act § 402(b), 47 U.S.C. 5 402(b) (1970); Shipping Act S 26, 46 U.S.C.
§ 825 (1970); Trust Indenture Act § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. 5 78y (1970); Public Utilities Holding Company
Act § 24(a), 15 U.S.C. 5 79(a) (1970).
"Interstate Commerce Act § 205(g), 49 U.S.C. § 305(g) (1970); Motor Carriers
Act § 205(h), 49 U.S.C. § 305(h) (1970).
"The judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are not applicable to the court of appeals." Schmerer, The Unreviewability of Emergency Orders of
the Federal Aviation Agency-The Concept of Preventive Administrative Proceedings,
17 MIAMI L. REv. 348, 360 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Schmerer]. See also City of
Dallas v. Rentzel, 172 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949).
"The usual provisions for review of orders has been held not to cover a refusal to
take jurisdiction. Hotel Employees v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958) (per curiam); ICC
v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912); Mallory Coal Co. v.
National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 99 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (statutory review
refused because the FTC ruling was not an "order").
"3 L. JAFFE 155.
24"The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support
an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent." L. JAFFE 357.
Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
"AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939) (dismissed by the court of appeals on petition for review
because lack of jurisdiction does not bar the action being brought in the district court);
Elmo Division of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also Shields
v. Utah I & C Ry., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424
F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 706, 5 U.S.C. 5 706 (1970) provides that:
"To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action." See K. DAVIS,
ADMiNISTRATmVE LAw TREATISE § 23.11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvIs].
No significant mention of the Administrative Procedure Act was made in the briefs
of either party or in the opinion. Probably the reason is because the general concensus
is that the APA has had a "negligible effect on the basic right of judicial review." L.
JAFFE 372; accord, Davis, Judicial Control of Administrative Action: A Review, 66
CoLUM. L. REv. 635 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis, A Review].
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The availability of both statutory and non-statutory review of administrative agency action has created a bifurcation of judicial review resuiting from both oversight and deliberate Congressional action providing for statutory relief." Although unintentional omission of statutory review for certain actions is the probable result of review statutes which
are overly detailed, the existing plurality of remedies" has been troublesome.
Disagreement among the commentators on the value of mandamus
and injunction as non-statutory review methods is evidence of the difficulties of their application, especially in seeking review of administrative
agency action."9 The use of the injunction in scrutinizing administrative
action in the absence of statutory review was first recognized in Noble
v. Union River Logging Co." and was firmly established in American
School of Magnetic Healing Co. v. McNulty." In Noble, the Secretary
of the Interior, through his statutory authority, granted a railroad right
of way which a succeeding Secretary attempted to revoke. The Supreme
Court affirmed the enjoining of the Secretary's actions stating that he
was without authority to act because issuance of the right of way removed the Secretary's power to control the right of way. The significance
of Noble is rooted in the Court's recognition that mandamus and injunction are correlative, when dealing with official ministerial action or inaction, especially where there is personal injury without adequate compensation at law. In American School the Postmaster of the United States
was successfully enjoined from prohibiting delivery of mails because of
a mistaken interpretation of the statute permitting such action. The
Court in American School stated that the courts should be able to scrutinize administrative action with such tools as injunctions, or otherwise
the individual is subjected to absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action
of an administrative officer whose action is unauthorized.
The absence of legislative guidance seems to have created a presumption of judicial review.' Injunctions have been utilized in situations lack26Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
27
1L. JAFFE 158.
2

1 K. DAVIS § 23.03 at 798 (Supp. 1970).
29Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162 (1913) (certiorari eliminated as a method of
review of administrative action where relief was available in equity). L. JAFFE at 167
hints that Degge v. Hitchcock took the wrong view of certiorari. See K. DAVIS at 641
where Professor Davis disagrees with Professor Jaffe, contending that that absence of

certiorari as a means of reviewing administrative action has aided the federal court system.
29

Professor Davis and Professor Jaffe are two of the major combatants. See, e.g.,

note 29 supra; see also Schmerer at 348.
3' Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893).
2

American School of Magnetic Healing Co. v. McNulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).

United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949).

'"
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ing both statutory review procedures' and no appealable "order" by the
administrative agency.' Moreover, injunctive relief has been employed

successfully even though statutory review methods are deemed "exclusive."' Traditional grounds for the issuance of an injunction have been
threat of irreparable injury"7 and inadequacy of legal remedy, 8 although
strict adherence to these requirements frequently makes the use of the
injunction unavailable. For example in the instant case, Shaffer, con-

ceivably INCA could demonstrate threat of irreparable harm by alleging
potential loss of life resulting from a failure of an inertial navigation system due to the allegedly improper promulgation of standards for INS
operation and maintenance. Further, authority exists for easing the tra-

ditional requirements for an injunction thereby developing this equitable
remedy into a "general utility remedy."' Conceivably, the district court

will grant the permanent injunction, thus cancelling all outstanding
authorizations for INS, and prevent the FAA from approving further
INS systems. Nevertheless, a relaxed view of the injunction requirements
is in the minority;" it is more likely that the injunction will be denied
I United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous
Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939).
"Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939) (repudiation of the
negative order doctrine seems to imply that a dismissal of a complaint is reviewable as
an order directing a change in status); Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R.R., 305 U.S. 177
(1938); Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938) (declaration of status held
not reviewable as an order).
31Leedom v. International Union of Mine & Smelter Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956)
(affirmance of the issuance of an injunction by the district court against a NLRB order
dismissing a proceeding when the statute provided for exclusive review by the court of
appeals); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Elmo Division
of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Aron v. FTC, 50 F. Supp.
289 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
' 7 Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181
F.2d 796, 800 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Black River Valley Broadcasts v. McNinch, 101
F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
Section 706 of the APA has not changed the above law. United Gas Pipe Line Co.
v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
18Black River Valley Broadcasts v. McNinch, 101 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1950); K.
DAVIS § 23.04 at 308.
"Professor Davis is critical of Professor Jaffe for not citing authority in stating the
proposition that the "injunction 'is granted pursuant to the formula of a threatened
irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law.'" 3 K. DAVIs § 23.04
at 308; Davis, A Review 641 n.33; note 25 supra. Davis immediately states that the
"federal court almost always silently forget any such 'formula,'" and does not seem to
cite any authority either. Thus it would seem that Davis' proposition is no more authoritative than Jaffe's. 3 K. DAVIS § 23.04 at 308.
"This equitable remedy of injunction is a catchall." L. JAFFE at 193.
40 Their disagreement spills over into other areas of securing equitable relief. See
note 30 supra.
Mandamus is a popular method of reviewing administrative actions, but was not
sought in INCA v. Shaffer. The remedy of mandamus, compelling an officer to perform
a duty, is riddled with dichotomies such as a ministerial/discretionary distinction. 3 K.
DAVIS § 23.11 at 349; Schmerer at 356; Davis, A Review at 641.
3 K. DAvis § 23.10 at 343: "Mandamus is ... burdened with intricacies having no
relation to modern practical needs ....
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thereby forcing INCA to appeal.'
Whether the pending permanent injunction is granted or denied in the
district court is a secondary issue, primarily because both the issuance or
denial of an injunction has drawbacks. Seeking an injunction in the district court is an undesirable means of review of administrative agency
action since an appeal has a broader effect than the injunction. In addition, a greater burden of proof is required for an injunction to issue than
is required for statutory appeals. The requirement of threat of irreparable
harm, for example, indicates that the remedy is available only in the most
serious matters. Enjoining the use of INS is also undesirable because it
will not solve the problem of how to obtain the adequate guidelines for
operation and maintenance of INS. Finally, the airlines, which have invested a considerable amount of money in reliance upon the Administrator's approval of INS,' would also suffer severe pecuniary loss. Since
INCA is thereby forced to traverse the hazardous avenue of injunctive
relief because of the lack of statutory appeal from this type of action by
the Administrator, Shaffer calls into question the adequacy of procedures
for review of action by administrative agencies in general, and by the
Administrator of the FAA in particular.
Other arguments can be made for reversal of the court's reasoning in
Shaffer. For example, in matters of air safety the public properly relies
on the expertise of the Administrator. Thus, when substantial allegations
that the Administrator has breached his statutory responsibility are
made, it is in the public interest that some avenue of independent review
be available for consideration of these charges. In these circumstances
judicial supervision becomes particularly important.
The court in Shafler fails to consider the argument made by the petitioner that the FAA had issued the operating authority for INS without
prescribing regulatory standards and before issuing application procedures." The petitioner further alleges that the use of an advisory circular
for authorization of INS merely outlines the application procedures to
be followed, instead of delineating the more precise minimum performance standards required for previous navigational systems. Even though
the use of the informal advisory circular preserves the flexibility in the
criteria used in approving the implementation of such systems," the validity of this contention should not obscure the position that a colorable
allegation by INCA should be analyzed through judicial supervision and
" The permanent injunction was left pending. 444 F.2d at 908.
Reliance in form of monetary investment is, at best, only one factor to consider
in seeking to preclude reversal of agency approval. "When adjudication seriously touches
property or interests of great moment, due process requires judicial process." L. JAFFE
at 388.
42

"Brief for Petitioner at 14.
intervenors, American Airlines, Inc., Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., Transworld Airlines, Inc., made this argument.
4The
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not avoided by use of statutory provisions which supposedly safeguard
judicial review. The absence of direct statutory review and the inadequacy of extraordinary remedies reflects the need for additional relief.
Still, the existence of a bifurcated system of judicial review and the plurality of remedies should not enable administrative action to escape scrutiny. Shaffer highlights the need that some means of direct statutory review should be provided. Presently, it is apparent that the Administrator
can circumvent statutory review by use of the advisory circular and by
refusing to entertain a complaint of his own action brought under section 1006. ' Although the Shaffer court suggests that this case is the first
time section 1006 has "been utilized to complain of the Administrator
for failure to adequately perform his asserted statutory responsibilities,"'
the result is that section 1006 is ineffective in securing review. The obvious answer to the problem is further legislation to provide for direct
review by the court for serious alleged violations of the Act by the Administrator. Judicial reasoning permitting the Administrator to be in a
position to give de facto approval to his own action by exercising discretion not to review it is highly suspect, if not specious.
Finally, the traditional notions of safeguarding judicial review vis-d-vis
administrative activity can be fully protected without permitting an administrative agency the luxury of arbitrariness that necessarily results
from any judicial "hands off" approach. The severe burdens on the court
inherently present with potential review of every action of the Administrator can be avoided by the existence of an external standard to determine what actions are reviewable. The obvious benefit is elimination of
the necessity for consideration of frivolous or inconsequential issues by
the court. More importantly, however, avoidance of judicial review of
administrative activity and decisions by such means as the combined use
of an advisory circular and section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act,
applauded by the court in Shaffer, fosters the dangerous situation where
individuals are subject to increasing administrative action but are deprived of any effective power to curb arbitrary and capricious behavior
in agency decision-making, notwithstanding abdication of the public interest in such matters as maintaining a high level of safety in aviation.
Any result granting a presumption in favor of administrative activity, the
necessary corollary of Shaffer, is therefore hardly consistent with equitable principles which demand protection of individuals from unlimited
officialdom.
The solution to preventing judicial review from being buried in the
labyrinth of the statutes is to allow all interested parties to constantly
question actions and decisions of an administrative agency. Whatever
46

See note 12 supra.
444 F.2d at 908.
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standard is adopted, it is imperative that accessible avenues of review be
available; otherwise, opportunities for abuse of administrative power
quickly multiply into an omnipotent administrative action."
William David Elliott

RAILWAY LABOR

ACT-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF THE UNION

SHOP PROVISION-The Railway Labor Act Provision Permitting Union
Shop Arrangements Does Not Violate The First Amendment. Gray v.
Gulf M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1001 (1971).
Richard Gray, a Seventh Day Adventist, had religious beliefs which
forbade membership in, or financial support of, labor unions. The railroad that employed him entered into a union shop agreement pursuant
to section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act.' Section 2, Eleventh
is the statutory basis for union shop agreements in the railroad industry.
The Act specifically provides that carriers and unions shall be permitted "to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that . . . all employees shall become members of the labor
organizations representing their craft or class. . . ."' Subsequent language in the Act, however, makes it clear that active membership in the
union cannot be required of a railroad employee; all that can be required
is the payment of union dues, initiation fees, and assessments. Gray
refused to comply with the terms of the union shop agreement and was
dismissed. He contended that section 2, Eleventh, as applied to his particular situation, was violative of the first amendment's free exercise
clause. The district court denied relief. Held, affirmed: The Railway
Labor Act provision which permits union shop arrangements does not
violate the first amendment. Gray v. Gulf M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
The Fifth Circuit based its holding upon Railway Employee's Department, AFL v. Hanson' and International Association of Machinists v.
4
Shaffer is already being cited as authority for not allowing an interested party to
attack the Administrator. See the dismissal of the complaint of the Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., Docket No. 23254 (CAB March 31, 1971),
Order No. 71-7-140 (July 26, 1971).
'45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970).
'id.
'Id.
4
Gray v. Gulf M. & 0. R.R., 302 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Ala. 1969).
5351 U.S. 225 (1956).

dismissed, CAB
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Street.' In Hanson, the Supreme Court considered the first challenge to
section 2, Eleventh. Employees of the Union Pacific Railroad brought
suit to enjoin the application and enforcement of the agreement entered
into between the railroad and various labor organizations. The employees argued that compulsory union membership would impair freedom
of expression. The Court, in upholding the Act, did not rule on the first
amendment question because it was not presented by the record." Instead
the Court based its holding on the Commerce Clause.! In Street a group
of railroad employees sought to enjoin the enforcement of a union shop
agreement because substantial portions of their dues were used to support political causes repugnant to them. The Supreme Court avoided
the constitutional questions by holding that the union had no authority,
under the Railway Labor Act, to use the funds in such a fashion.' The
Court also ruled that an injunction restraining the enforcement of the
union shop agreement was not the proper remedy because the union shop
was not unlawful."
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit relied on Hanson and Street,
stating that the Supreme Court decisions "are dispositive of the issue.""
The court implicity reasoned as follows: the union shop was held constitutional in Hanson; a Street argument is not involved because dues
were used only for purposes sanctioned by the Act; Gray, therefore, had
not been deprived of any rights when compelled to join the union.
The key to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning is its broad construction of
Hanson. Since the Supreme Court had already explained Hanson in
Street, the Fifth Circuit's reading of Hanson should be analyzed in conjunction with that discussion. In Street, the Supreme Court stated that
Hanson's holding referred only to the Railway Labor Act on its face"
and that the ruling did not apply to the particular constitutional rights
of an individual.' The Court expressly stated that a freedom of expression issue had not been presented in Hanson:
[W]e pass narrowly on § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act ...
[A]II that was held in Hanson was that § 2, Eleventh was constitutional
in its bare authorization of union-shop contracts requiring workers to
'367 U.S. 740 (1961).
7351

U.S. at 238.

8 Id.

'367 U.S. at 768-69.
10Id. at 771.

"Gray v. Gulf M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1068 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
11"[I)t becomes obvious that this Court passed merely on the constitutional validity
of § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act on its face, and not as applied to infringe

the particularized constitutional rights of any individual." 367 U.S. at 748 (emphasis
added).
1 Id.

474
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give "financial support" to unions.... We sustained this requirementand only this requirement.... Clearly we passed neither upon forced

14
association in any other aspect....

The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the freedom of
expression argument because the Court noted that the Railway Labor
Act had built-in safeguards to protect employees after being initiated into
the union." The premise was that the deprivation of employee rights
could not rise to constitutional dimensions because the abrogation would
be redressed via a statutory construction of the Act.' Therefore, the
holding in Hanson, that the union shop agreement under the Railway
Labor Act did not deprive an employee of his first amendment rights,
was referrable only to the situation which arises after the employee
became a union member.
Gray's argument, however, was that the Act was unconstitutional
as applied. As any union support offended his religious beliefs, he was
deprived of his first amendment right to religious freedom when forced
to join the union at the outset. Therefore, the premise the Supreme
Court relied on in Hanson, that after becoming a union member the
Railway Labor Act offers ample protection, was not applicable to Gray.
Once forced to become a union member, the harm would already have
been done to him, and the statute could not undo the damage. Thus,
Gray presented an issue reserved by the Supreme Court in Hanson and
Street."
The Supreme Court, distinguishing Street from Hanson, indicated
that the constitutional question presented in Street was not disposed of in
Hanson:
It is argued that our disposition of the First Amendment claims in
Hanson disposes of appellee's constitutional claims in this case adversely
to their contentions. We disagree .... [T]hat case decided only that § 2,
Eleventh, in authorizing collective agreements conditioning employees'
continued employment on payment of union dues, initiation fees and
assessments, did not on its face impinge upon protected rights of association."

Although Gray could have been distinguished from Hanson by applying
1d. at 749 (emphasis added).
The Court clearly indicated that Congress designed the RLA to prevent the unions
from using the union shop to abridge freedom of speech and beliefs: "The words 'not
including fines and penalties' were added [to the RLA] to make it clear that the termination of union membership for their non-payment would not be grounds for discharge."
Id. at 766.
16This is precisely the chain of events that occurred in Street.
1 367 U.S. at 749-49: "[Ilf the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is
used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of
the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case." (em-

phasis added).

18Id.at 746-47. (emphasis added).
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the exact words used by the Supreme Court in distinguishing Street, the
Fifth Circuit considered Hanson to be dispositive of the constitutional
issues presented by Gray's appeal.
The Fifth Circuit did not refer to the language used by the Supreme
Court to limit Hanson. Instead, emphasis was placed on the statement
in Street that "'[t]he union shop agreement itself is not unlawful. The
appellees therefore remain... obliged [to pay their dues].' """ The Fifth
Circuit then concluded:
Street left unimpaired the imprimatur of constitutionality which had
been placed on § 2, Eleventh, by Hanson. Only the expenditure of union
funds for non-collective bargaining purposes was interdicted by the
Court's statutory construction in Street."
This conclusion was based on a segment in Street where the Supreme
Court stated that, if the dues had been used properly, there would have
been no objection." The premise relied on does not support the conclusion reached for three reasons. First, the statement was made in
Street to indicate that the basis of the decision was a statutory, rather
than aconstitutional construction; second, the language referred specifically to the fact situation in Street; and third, Gray is distinguishable
because, unlike Street, Gray did have a legitimate grievance even though
the money was used for the purposes contemplated. The Fifth Circuit
did not make these distinctions; instead, the court concluded: "[W]e
note that plaintiff Gray has never been asked to subscribe to any tenets
or doctrines of unionism. He has merely been requested to pay his share
of the cost of collective bargaining .. ."" This conclusion is indicative
of the court's disposition not to grapple with the issue presented. The
"mere" payment of his share of the cost of collective bargaining would
have constituted as great an infringement of Gray's religious beliefs as
more active forms of union membership. Gray's religious beliefs forbade
the financial support of a union as well as active membership therein."
Moreover, even the Fifth Circuit specifically noted that Gray's refusal
to pay dues was the result of a "sincere religious conviction." Under
these circumstances, the court's statement that Gray "has never been
asked to subscribe to any tenets or doctrines of unionism" ' is a non
sequitur."'
19429 F.2d at 1071.
0 Id. (emphasis added by Fifth Circuit).
21367 U.S. at 771.
22429 F.2d at 1072.
2Id.
24

Id.

2Id.
26 See Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 1970) (a case decided nine days before Gray was handed down). Dewey was fired because, as a result
of religious convictions, he would not work on Sunday and would not make arrange-
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Even though the Fifth Circuit felt that Supreme Court precedent was
dispositive of the issues presented by Gray, the court justified the ap-

proach with a constitutional argument: "The First Amendment's protection of religious conscience is not absolute when a religious opinion
is translated into an act or a refusal to act."" After an attempt to support this contention with a brief discussion of five Supreme Court cases, 8
the Fifth Circuit uncategorically accepted the sincerity of Gray's religious beliefs." Ironically, after the Fifth Circuit adroitly avoided the
religious question, the court accepted Gray's assertion of religious sin-

cerity, a fact that was fully litigated in the trial and appellate courts."0
While an argument could be made that the Fifth Circuit thus foreclosed
the question of "religious sincerity," it could be asserted that the court

was indicating that religious sincerity would be controlling in a different
case. If the latter approach is indicated, the court has opened a "Pandora's Box." If sincerity of belief is litigable, where will the line be drawn?

How observant must one be in order to be classified as sincere? Once
sincerity is accepted will the validity of the religion itself be questioned?

Should the beliefs of a "recognized religion" be given more weght than
a less popular religion?
The Fifth Circuit could have avoided the religious freedom quagmire

and still faced the individual rights question by analyzing the problem
ments for a replacement. The Sixth Circuit held that there was no religious discrimination because the employee could arrange for a Sunday replacement. The dissent strongly objected to this reasoning:
The majority views the existence of this [replacement] privilege as a reasonable accommodation to Dewey's religious needs, and notes that 'he
stubbornly refused to exercise this privilege.' This 'stubborn' refusal on
Dewey's part was grounded in his belief that working on Sunday is inherently wrong and that it would be a sin for him to induce another to work
in his place. The replacement system was therefore no solution to Dewey's
problem.
Id. at 333 (dissenting opinion).
,7429 F.2d at 1072.
"

Although the Court refused to sanction a state statute compelling a salute
to the flag where religious conscience said 'nay,' West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette [citation omitted], the Court did uphold compulsory vaccination requirements even when they offended religious conscience, Jacobson v. Massachusetts [citation omitted). Although the Court
refused to sanction a state's denial of unemployment compensation to sabbatarians who refused all Saturday employment, Sherbert v. Verner
[citation omitted], the Court did uphold Sunday closing laws which were
applied to sabbatarians despite their claims that such laws interfered with
the free exercise of their religion, Braunfeld v. Brown [citation omitted].
Long ago the Court held a statute forbidding polygamy constitutional even
when applied to Mormons who had a genuine and sincere conviction that
polygamy was a practice commanded by God. Reynolds v. United States
[citation omitted).

Id.
Although offered as foils to isolate the religious freedom issue, these cases cannot be
rationally distinguished from each other.
29

Id.

0429 F.2d at 1065-66 n.4.
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as the Supreme Court did in Sherbert v. Verner." There, a Seventh Day
Adventist was denied unemployment compensation because she refused
to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Initially the Court deliberated
whether there was a substantial infringement of the appellant's first
amendment rights. Finding the infringement, the Court then concluded
that there was no compelling governmental interest justifying a substantial encroachment upon the appellant's rights.
Had the Fifth Circuit taken the Sherbert approach, the first issue to
be decided would have been whether Gray had any constitutional rights.
Generally, an individual is entitled to freely exercise his religion without
governmental interference. The question is whether Gray's constitutionally protected rights were significantly disturbed. As in Sherbert, loss of
employment could have fallen within the significant interference category. The final question would then be whether there was any compelling governmental interest justifying interference with Gray's religious
freedom. This query necessitates a study of policy considerations.
The key policy issue concerns the usage of the term "free-rider." The
theory which the union urged is that a "free-rider" is a non-member
employee who obtains, without cost to himself, the benefits of collective
bargaining." As the cost of collective bargaining should be spread
among all employees, the "free-rider" should be discharged." The Supreme Court noted in Street that Congress adopted the union's definition." Gray must be classified as a "free-rider"; but should he be discharged? The Supreme Court recognized that Congress gave labor unions
an important role to play in the legislative policy which seeks to stabilize
labor relations in the railroad industry;"5 that the performance of this
function was expensive;," and that non-union members shared in the
benefits of the unions' collective bargaining.' The Court also recognized
that Congress determined that these considerations outweigh complete
individual freedom of choice."
Had the preceding approach been utilized, the union position would
have prevailed." Thus, the Fifth Circuit reached the correct decision,
but for the wrong reasons.
Michael Stein
1372 U.S. 398 (1963).
"2367 U.S. at 763 n.14.
"Id. at 764 n.15.
Id. at 765-66.
"Id. at 760.
"3Id. at 761.
87Id. at 762.
8Id. at 763.
"' The Fifth Circuit did mention these policy considerations. However, the discussion
was used primarily as a justification of Hanson and Street and only as an incidental
reference to Gray. 429 F.2d at 1072.

